CyberSecBulletin
CVE-2026-110879NVD status: Awaiting Analysis

jackson-databind: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

Published Updated By the CyberSecBulletin desk

CVE-2026-110879 is a critical-severity deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability in jackson-databind from FasterXML, with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.8 out of 10. It can be exploited remotely over the network by an unauthenticated attacker, without any action from a user. The record lists versions 2.18.12, 2.21.8, 2.22.4 as the first without the flaw, so updating jackson-databind to one of those releases or later removes the exposure. There is no confirmed exploitation so far. EPSS estimates a 1.2% chance of exploitation within 30 days, higher than 69% of scored CVEs.

Patch this week

Critical severity: a successful attack would have severe impact.

What to do

  1. Update jackson-databind to 2.18.12 or 2.21.8 or 2.22.4 or 3.1.8, whichever matches your release line, or a later version.
  2. Read the advisory on github.com for workarounds and exact fixed builds.
  3. Until you can update, restrict network access to the affected service so it is not reachable from untrusted networks.

Affected products and versions

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed in
FasterXMLjackson-databind2.10.0 up to, but not including, 2.18.12; 2.19.0 up to, but not including, 2.21.8; 2.22.0 up to, but not including, 2.22.4; 3.0.0 up to, but not including, 3.1.8; 3.2.0 up to, but not including, 3.2.42.18.12, 2.21.8, 2.22.4, 3.1.8, 3.2.4

Version data comes from the organisation that assigned the CVE. Confirm against the vendor advisory before deciding you are unaffected.

How the severity score breaks down

Attack vector
NetworkCan be exploited remotely over a network, including the internet.
Attack complexity
LowNo special conditions are needed; the attack works reliably.
Privileges required
NoneNo account or login is needed.
User interaction
NoneNo action by a victim is required.
Scope
UnchangedImpact stays within the vulnerable component.
Confidentiality
HighAll data handled by the component can be read.
Integrity
HighData or code can be modified at will.
Availability
HighThe component can be taken down completely.

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Scored by CNA.

Official description

jackson-databind validates the outer class of a class-name type ID but accepts attacker-selected classes inside its generic arguments, even when those classes violate the declared type or would be rejected as direct type IDs. This bypasses the generic-argument validation added for CVE-2026-54512 (GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm), of which this is an incomplete fix. DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() checks the outer class against the declared base type and then passes each argument from the type ID to _validateTypeParameter(), which validates the argument against the outer base type rather than enforcing its corresponding declared generic binding. It also invokes validators with arguments that have not passed the subtype check those validators expect. Under the default DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator this accepts an unrelated class inside a generic subtype even when the same class is rejected as a direct type ID. Where an allowIfBaseType(...) rule approves the outer type, Jackson substitutes LaissezFaireSubTypeValidator, so the configured validator no longer restricts the embedded arguments. The element type of a plain array type ID such as [Lpkg.Gadget; is likewise left unvalidated once the array's base type is approved. Affected paths include annotation-based class-name polymorphism with a default Jackson 3.x JsonMapper, configured default typing in both Jackson 2.x and 3.x, and integrations that expose that default typing. The default-validator case requires no application-authored validator: with @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS), a direct gadget type ID is rejected as "Not a subtype", while a type ID naming a generic wrapper around the same gadget is accepted and deserialized, including attacker-supplied bean properties. Where class-name default typing permits Map, a property declared as Map<String,String> accepts HashMap<FileSystemXmlApplicationContext,String>; map-key discovery then passes the attacker-controlled JSON property name to the selected class's one-string constructor. With Spring on the classpath and attacker-controlled XML the application can load, that constructor loads the XML and invokes ProcessBuilder.start() under the application account, giving arbitrary command execution. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 2.10.0 and tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 3.0.0. Releases before 2.10.0 are not affected, because PolymorphicTypeValidator was introduced in jackson-databind 2.10.0.

Source: the CVE record as published by its numbering authority, via NVD and CVE.org.

The underlying weakness: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How developers prevent this class of flaw

  • If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.

More Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerabilities (CWE-502)

Timeline

  1. CVE record published.
  2. CISA published its SSVC assessment (exploitation: none, automatable: yes, technical impact: total).
  3. Record last changed materially (score, affected products, status or references).

References

Other vulnerabilities in jackson-databind

All jackson-databind vulnerabilities

Recent Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerabilities

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