angular-cli: Server-Side Request Forgery
CVE-2026-27739 is a critical-severity server-side request forgery vulnerability in angular-cli from Angular, with a CVSS 4.0 base score of 9.2 out of 10. It can be exploited remotely over the network by an unauthenticated attacker, without any action from a user. Affected angular-cli versions: >= 21.2.0-next.2, < 21.2.0-rc.0; >= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.1.5; >= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.17, and others listed below. The record does not name a fixed version, so check the vendor advisory. There is no confirmed exploitation so far. EPSS estimates a 0.55% chance of exploitation within 30 days, which is low compared with other CVEs.
Critical severity: a successful attack would have severe impact.
What to do
- Check which version of angular-cli you run against the affected versions below, and install the vendor's latest release.
- Read the advisory on github.com for workarounds and exact fixed builds.
- Until you can update, restrict network access to the affected service so it is not reachable from untrusted networks.
Affected products and versions
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Angular | angular-cli | >= 21.2.0-next.2, < 21.2.0-rc.0; >= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.1.5; >= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.17; < 19.2.21 | Not stated |
| Angular | @nguniversal/common | <= 16.2.0 | Not stated |
| Angular | @nguniversal/express-engine | <= 16.2.0 | Not stated |
Version data comes from the organisation that assigned the CVE. Confirm against the vendor advisory before deciding you are unaffected.
How the severity score breaks down
- Attack vector
- NetworkCan be exploited remotely over a network, including the internet.
- Attack complexity
- LowNo special conditions are needed; the attack works reliably.
- Attack requirements
- NoneThe attack does not depend on a particular deployment or configuration.
- Privileges required
- NoneNo account or login is needed.
- User interaction
- NoneNo action by a victim is required.
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- HighSerious loss of confidentiality on the vulnerable system.
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- LowLimited loss of integrity on the vulnerable system.
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- NoneNo loss of availability on the vulnerable system.
- Confidentiality (other systems)
- HighSerious loss of confidentiality on systems beyond the vulnerable one.
- Integrity (other systems)
- LowLimited loss of integrity on systems beyond the vulnerable one.
- Availability (other systems)
- NoneNo loss of availability on systems beyond the vulnerable one.
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X. Scored by CNA (github.com).
Official description
The Angular SSR is a server-rise rendering tool for Angular applications. Versions prior to 21.2.0-rc.1, 21.1.5, 20.3.17, and 19.2.21 have a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the Angular SSR request handling pipeline. The vulnerability exists because Angular’s internal URL reconstruction logic directly trusts and consumes user-controlled HTTP headers specifically the Host and `X-Forwarded-*` family to determine the application's base origin without any validation of the destination domain. Specifically, the framework didn't have checks for the host domain, path and character sanitization, and port validation. This vulnerability manifests in two primary ways: implicit relative URL resolution and explicit manual construction. When successfully exploited, this vulnerability allows for arbitrary internal request steering. This can lead to credential exfiltration, internal network probing, and a confidentiality breach. In order to be vulnerable, the victim application must use Angular SSR (Server-Side Rendering), the application must perform `HttpClient` requests using relative URLs OR manually construct URLs using the unvalidated `Host` / `X-Forwarded-*` headers using the `REQUEST` object, the application server must be reachable by an attacker who can influence these headers without strict validation from a front-facing proxy, and the infrastructure (Cloud, CDN, or Load Balancer) must not sanitize or validate incoming headers. Versions 21.2.0-rc.1, 21.1.5, 20.3.17, and 19.2.21 contain a patch. Some workarounds are available. Avoid using `req.headers` for URL construction. Instead, use trusted variables for base API paths. Those who cannot upgrade immediately should implement a middleware in their `server.ts` to enforce numeric ports and validated hostnames.
Source: the CVE record as published by its numbering authority, via NVD and CVE.org.
The underlying weakness: Server-Side Request Forgery
The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
How developers prevent this class of flaw
- If there is a known list of applications, IP, hostname, and/or domains to which the product is allowed to communicate, then use allowlists to ensure that outgoing requests are restricted to these known entities. The allowlists could be in the application code or possibly enforced by firewalls or network segmentation.
- If the product is expected to be able to connect to arbitrary IP addresses or domains, consider using a denylist that includes private network addresses, internal domain names, etc. The denylist could be in the application code or possibly enforced by firewalls or network segmentation.
Timeline
- CVE record published.
- CISA published its SSVC assessment (exploitation: none, automatable: yes, technical impact: partial).
- Record last changed materially (score, affected products, status or references).
References
Patches and release notes
Other references
Other vulnerabilities in angular-cli
- 9.0 Critical severity
- 8.7 High severity
Recent Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities
- 7.6 High severity
- 7.4 High severity
- 7.7 High severity
- 7.5 High severity
- 7.5 High severity
- 7.5 High severity
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