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CVE-2026-41197NVD status: Deferred

noir: Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size

CVE-2026-41197 is a critical-severity incorrect calculation of buffer size vulnerability in noir from Noir-lang, with a CVSS 4.0 base score of 9.3 out of 10. It can be exploited remotely over the network by an unauthenticated attacker, without any action from a user. Affected noir versions: < 1.0.0-beta.19. The record does not name a fixed version, so check the vendor advisory. There is no confirmed exploitation so far. EPSS estimates a 0.4% chance of exploitation within 30 days, which is low compared with other CVEs.

Patch this week

Critical severity: a successful attack would have severe impact.

What to do

  1. Check which version of noir you run against the affected versions below, and install the vendor's latest release.
  2. Read the advisory on github.com for workarounds and exact fixed builds.
  3. Until you can update, restrict network access to the affected service so it is not reachable from untrusted networks.

Affected products and versions

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed in
Noir-langnoir< 1.0.0-beta.19Not stated

Version data comes from the organisation that assigned the CVE. Confirm against the vendor advisory before deciding you are unaffected.

How the severity score breaks down

Attack vector
NetworkCan be exploited remotely over a network, including the internet.
Attack complexity
LowNo special conditions are needed; the attack works reliably.
Attack requirements
NoneThe attack does not depend on a particular deployment or configuration.
Privileges required
NoneNo account or login is needed.
User interaction
NoneNo action by a victim is required.
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
HighSerious loss of confidentiality on the vulnerable system.
Integrity (vulnerable system)
HighSerious loss of integrity on the vulnerable system.
Availability (vulnerable system)
HighSerious loss of availability on the vulnerable system.
Confidentiality (other systems)
NoneNo loss of confidentiality on systems beyond the vulnerable one.
Integrity (other systems)
NoneNo loss of integrity on systems beyond the vulnerable one.
Availability (other systems)
NoneNo loss of availability on systems beyond the vulnerable one.

Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X. Scored by CNA (github.com).

Official description

Noir is a Domain Specific Language for SNARK proving systems that is designed to use any ACIR compatible proving system, and Brillig is the bytecode ACIR uses for non-determinism. Noir programs can invoke external functions through foreign calls. When compiling to Brillig bytecode, the SSA instructions are processed block-by-block in `BrilligBlock::compile_block()`. When the compiler encounters an `Instruction::Call` with a `Value::ForeignFunction` target, it invokes `codegen_call()` in `brillig_call/code_gen_call.rs`, which dispatches to `convert_ssa_foreign_call()`. Before emitting the foreign call opcode, the compiler must pre-allocate memory for any array results the call will return. This happens through `allocate_external_call_results()`, which iterates over the result types. For `Type::Array` results, it delegates to `allocate_foreign_call_result_array()` to recursively allocate memory on the heap for nested arrays. The `BrilligArray` struct is the internal representation of a Noir array in Brillig IR. Its `size` field represents the semi-flattened size, the total number of memory slots the array occupies, accounting for the fact that composite types like tuples consume multiple slots per element. This size is computed by `compute_array_length()` in `brillig_block_variables.rs`. For the outer array, `allocate_external_call_results()` correctly uses `define_variable()`, which internally calls `allocate_value_with_type()`. This function applies the formula above, producing the correct semi-flattened size. However, for nested arrays, `allocate_foreign_call_result_array()` contains a bug. The pattern `Type::Array(_, nested_size)` discards the inner types with `_` and uses only `nested_size`, the semantic length of the nested array (the number of logical elements), not the semi-flattened size. For simple element types this works correctly, but for composite element types it under-allocates. Foreign calls returning nested arrays of tuples or other composite types corrupt the Brillig VM heap. Version 1.0.0-beta.19 fixes this issue.

Source: the CVE record as published by its numbering authority, via NVD and CVE.org.

The underlying weakness: Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size

The product does not correctly calculate the size to be used when allocating a buffer.

How developers prevent this class of flaw

  • When allocating a buffer for the purpose of transforming, converting, or encoding an input, allocate enough memory to handle the largest possible encoding. For example, in a routine that converts & characters to &amp; for HTML entity encoding, the output buffer needs to be at least 5 times as large as the input buffer.
  • Understand the programming language's underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation (CWE-681). Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, not-a-number calculations, and how the language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. Also be careful to account for 32-bit, 64-bit, and other potential differences that may affect the numeric representation.
  • Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range.

More Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size vulnerabilities (CWE-131)

Timeline

  1. CVE record published.
  2. CISA published its SSVC assessment (exploitation: none, automatable: yes, technical impact: total).
  3. Record last changed materially (score, affected products, status or references).

References

Recent Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size vulnerabilities

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