CyberSecBulletin
CVE-2026-43866NVD status: Analyzed

Apache Camel: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

Published Updated By the CyberSecBulletin desk

CVE-2026-43866 is a high-severity deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability in Apache Camel from Apache, with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.3 out of 10. It can be exploited remotely over the network by an unauthenticated attacker, without any action from a user. The record lists versions 4.14.8, 4.18.3, 4.21.0 as the first without the flaw, so updating Apache Camel to one of those releases or later removes the exposure. There is no confirmed exploitation so far. EPSS estimates a 0.65% chance of exploitation within 30 days, higher than 52% of scored CVEs.

Next patch cycle

High severity with no evidence of exploitation so far.

What to do

  1. Update Apache Camel to 4.14.8 or 4.18.3 or 4.21.0, whichever matches your release line, or a later version.
  2. Update Camel to 4.14.8 or 4.18.3 or 4.21.0, whichever matches your release line, or a later version.
  3. Read the advisory on camel.apache.org for workarounds and exact fixed builds.
  4. Until you can update, restrict network access to the affected service so it is not reachable from untrusted networks.

Affected products and versions

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed in
ApacheApache Camel3.0.0 up to, but not including, 4.14.8; 4.15.0 up to, but not including, 4.18.3; 4.19.0 up to, but not including, 4.21.04.14.8, 4.18.3, 4.21.0
ApacheCamel3.0.0 up to, but not including, 4.14.8; 4.15.0 up to, but not including, 4.18.3; 4.19.0 up to, but not including, 4.21.04.14.8, 4.18.3, 4.21.0

Version data comes from the organisation that assigned the CVE. Confirm against the vendor advisory before deciding you are unaffected.

How the severity score breaks down

Attack vector
NetworkCan be exploited remotely over a network, including the internet.
Attack complexity
LowNo special conditions are needed; the attack works reliably.
Privileges required
NoneNo account or login is needed.
User interaction
NoneNo action by a victim is required.
Scope
UnchangedImpact stays within the vulnerable component.
Confidentiality
LowSome restricted data can be read.
Integrity
LowLimited modification of data is possible.
Availability
LowPerformance or availability is reduced.

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L. Scored by CISA (ADP).

Official description

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel, Apache Camel JMS component. JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() in camel-jms - and the equivalent JmsBinding in camel-sjms - deserializes the payload of an incoming JMS ObjectMessage via jakarta.jms.ObjectMessage.getObject() whenever the mapJmsMessage option is enabled (the default) and Camel acts as a JMS consumer. The CVE-2026-40860 hardening added a post-deserialization class check that rejects classes outside the default allow-list java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*. However org.apache.camel.support.DefaultExchangeHolder itself lives in the allow-listed org.apache.camel.** namespace, so an ObjectMessage whose top-level object is a DefaultExchangeHolder passes the check. The receiving side then calls DefaultExchangeHolder.unmarshal() on it without requiring the transferExchange option to be enabled - an asymmetric trust boundary, since the sending side gates ObjectMessage and transferExchange handling but the receiving side did not - writing every non-null field of the holder into the Exchange: the message body, the IN and OUT headers, the exchange properties, the variables, the exchange id and the exception. An attacker who can publish an ObjectMessage to a queue or topic consumed by an affected Camel application can therefore inject arbitrary Exchange state using only universally-trusted java.lang and java.util types, with no deserialization gadget chain required, to manipulate routing and headers, exchange properties and error handling. The same handling applies to camel-sjms and camel-sjms2, and to the JMS-family components built on JmsComponent and JmsBinding: camel-amqp, camel-activemq and camel-activemq6. This is a bypass of the CVE-2026-40860 fix rather than a flaw in it. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 3.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0; Apache Camel: from 3.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, JMS ObjectMessage handling is disabled by default in camel-jms, camel-sjms and the JMS-family components (a new objectMessageEnabled option defaults to false at the component and endpoint level), so an incoming ObjectMessage - including a DefaultExchangeHolder payload - is no longer deserialized unless the option is explicitly enabled; only set objectMessageEnabled=true when the consumed JMS destination is fed exclusively by trusted producers. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, restrict publish access to the queues and topics consumed by Camel to trusted producers via JMS broker authorization, and do not expose JMS consumers that map ObjectMessage bodies to untrusted networks; a JMS-provider deserialization allow-list does not mitigate this specific bypass because the crafted payload uses only universally-trusted classes.

Source: the CVE record as published by its numbering authority, via NVD and CVE.org.

The underlying weakness: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How developers prevent this class of flaw

  • If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.

More Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerabilities (CWE-502)

Timeline

  1. CVE record published.
  2. CISA published its SSVC assessment (exploitation: none, automatable: yes, technical impact: partial).
  3. Record last changed materially (score, affected products, status or references).

References

Other vulnerabilities in Apache Camel

All Apache Camel vulnerabilities

Recent Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerabilities

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