FreeBSD: Stack-based Buffer Overflow
CVE-2026-45250 is a high-severity stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in FreeBSD, with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.8 out of 10. It can be exploited with local access to the system by an attacker with a low-privileged account, without any action from a user. The record lists versions p9, p5, p14 as the first without the flaw, so updating FreeBSD to one of those releases or later removes the exposure. There is no confirmed exploitation so far. EPSS estimates a 0.41% chance of exploitation within 30 days, which is low compared with other CVEs.
High severity with no evidence of exploitation so far.
What to do
- Update FreeBSD to p9 or p5 or p14, whichever matches your release line, or a later version.
- Read the advisory on security.freebsd.org for workarounds and exact fixed builds.
Affected products and versions
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| FreeBSD | FreeBSD | 15.0-RELEASE up to, but not including, p9; 14.4-RELEASE up to, but not including, p5; 14.3-RELEASE up to, but not including, p14 | p9, p5, p14 |
Version data comes from the organisation that assigned the CVE. Confirm against the vendor advisory before deciding you are unaffected.
How the severity score breaks down
- Attack vector
- LocalThe attacker needs local access or must trick a user into running something.
- Attack complexity
- LowNo special conditions are needed; the attack works reliably.
- Privileges required
- LowA basic user account is enough.
- User interaction
- NoneNo action by a victim is required.
- Scope
- UnchangedImpact stays within the vulnerable component.
- Confidentiality
- HighAll data handled by the component can be read.
- Integrity
- HighData or code can be modified at will.
- Availability
- HighThe component can be taken down completely.
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Scored by CISA (ADP).
Official description
The setcred(2) system call is only available to privileged users. However, before the privilege level of the caller is checked, the user-supplied list of supplementary groups is copied into a fixed-size kernel stack buffer without first validating its length. If the supplied list exceeds the capacity of that buffer, a stack buffer overflow occurs. Because the bounds check on the supplementary groups list occurs after the kernel stack buffer has already been written, an unprivileged local user may trigger the overflow without holding any special privilege. Successful exploitation may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the kernel, allowing an unprivileged local user to gain elevated privileges on the affected system.
Source: the CVE record as published by its numbering authority, via NVD and CVE.org.
The underlying weakness: Stack-based Buffer Overflow
The product writes past the end of a buffer that was allocated on the stack.
How developers prevent this class of flaw
- Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking. D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND discusses canary-based detection in detail.
- Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.
- Implement and perform bounds checking on input.
Timeline
- CVE record published.
- CISA published its SSVC assessment (exploitation: none, automatable: no, technical impact: total).
- Record last changed materially (score, affected products, status or references).
References
Other references
Other vulnerabilities in FreeBSD
- 7.0 High severity
- 7.0 High severity
- 7.0 High severity
- 7.0 High severity
- 7.0 High severity
- 8.4 High severity
Recent Stack-based Buffer Overflow vulnerabilities
- 8.8 High severity
- 8.8 High severity
- 7.5 High severity
- 9.3 Critical severity
- 9.8 Critical severity
- 7.2 High severity
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