CyberSecBulletin
CVE-2026-49283NVD status: Deferred

saml2: Improper Certificate Validation

CVE-2026-49283 is a high-severity improper certificate validation vulnerability in saml2 from Simplesamlphp, with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 8.7 out of 10. It can be exploited remotely over the network by an attacker with administrator privileges, without any action from a user. Affected saml2 versions: < 4.19.3; >= 4.20.0, < 4.20.2; >= 5.0.0, < 5.0.6, and others listed below. The record does not name a fixed version, so check the vendor advisory. There is no confirmed exploitation so far. EPSS estimates a 0.47% chance of exploitation within 30 days, which is low compared with other CVEs.

Next patch cycle

High severity with no evidence of exploitation so far.

What to do

  1. Check which version of saml2 you run against the affected versions below, and install the vendor's latest release.
  2. Read the advisory on github.com for workarounds and exact fixed builds.

Affected products and versions

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed in
Simplesamlphpsaml2< 4.19.3; >= 4.20.0, < 4.20.2; >= 5.0.0, < 5.0.6; >= 6.0.0, < 6.2.1Not stated

Version data comes from the organisation that assigned the CVE. Confirm against the vendor advisory before deciding you are unaffected.

How the severity score breaks down

Attack vector
NetworkCan be exploited remotely over a network, including the internet.
Attack complexity
LowNo special conditions are needed; the attack works reliably.
Privileges required
HighAdministrator-level access is required first.
User interaction
NoneNo action by a victim is required.
Scope
ChangedThe attack can reach beyond the vulnerable component into other systems.
Confidentiality
HighAll data handled by the component can be read.
Integrity
HighData or code can be modified at will.
Availability
NoneAvailability is not affected.

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N. Scored by CNA (github.com).

Official description

The SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 library is a PHP library for SAML2 related functionality. Prior to versions 4.19.3, 4.20.2, 5.0.6, and 6.2.1, the HTTPArtifact::receive() flow can treat an unsigned embedded SAML Response as cryptographically valid for the wrong identity provider. SOAPClient::addSSLValidator() attaches a TLS-based validator to the outer SOAP ArtifactResponse, while the embedded Response receives a validator that delegates to the outer message and is later checked against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer rather than necessarily the artifact issuer. SOAPClient::validateSSL() returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key being validated, and SAML2\Message::validate() treats a validator call that does not throw as successful. In a multi-IdP federation, a malicious or lower-trust IdP can therefore provide an ArtifactResponse containing an unsigned Response that claims a higher-trust victim IdP as issuer and authenticate as arbitrary users with attacker-chosen assertion attributes, NameID, and session data. This issue is fixed in versions 4.19.3, 4.20.2, 5.0.6, and 6.2.1.

Source: the CVE record as published by its numbering authority, via NVD and CVE.org.

The underlying weakness: Improper Certificate Validation

The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.

How developers prevent this class of flaw

  • Certificates should be carefully managed and checked to assure that data are encrypted with the intended owner's public key.
  • If certificate pinning is being used, ensure that all relevant properties of the certificate are fully validated before the certificate is pinned, including the hostname.

More Improper Certificate Validation vulnerabilities (CWE-295)

Timeline

  1. CVE record published.
  2. CISA published its SSVC assessment (exploitation: none, automatable: no, technical impact: total).
  3. Record last changed materially (score, affected products, status or references).

References

Other vulnerabilities in saml2

All saml2 vulnerabilities

Recent Improper Certificate Validation vulnerabilities

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