maravel-framework: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
CVE-2026-55250 is a high-severity authentication bypass by capture-replay vulnerability in maravel-framework from Macropay-solutions, with a CVSS 4.0 base score of 8.7 out of 10. It can be exploited remotely over the network by an unauthenticated attacker, without any action from a user. Affected maravel-framework versions: < 10.74.0. The record does not name a fixed version, so check the vendor advisory. There is no confirmed exploitation so far. EPSS estimates a 0.87% chance of exploitation within 30 days, higher than 59% of scored CVEs.
High severity with no evidence of exploitation so far.
What to do
- Check which version of maravel-framework you run against the affected versions below, and install the vendor's latest release.
- Until you can update, restrict network access to the affected service so it is not reachable from untrusted networks.
Affected products and versions
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Macropay-solutions | maravel-framework | < 10.74.0 | Not stated |
Version data comes from the organisation that assigned the CVE. Confirm against the vendor advisory before deciding you are unaffected.
How the severity score breaks down
- Attack vector
- NetworkCan be exploited remotely over a network, including the internet.
- Attack complexity
- LowNo special conditions are needed; the attack works reliably.
- Attack requirements
- NoneThe attack does not depend on a particular deployment or configuration.
- Privileges required
- NoneNo account or login is needed.
- User interaction
- NoneNo action by a victim is required.
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- NoneNo loss of confidentiality on the vulnerable system.
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- HighSerious loss of integrity on the vulnerable system.
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- NoneNo loss of availability on the vulnerable system.
- Confidentiality (other systems)
- NoneNo loss of confidentiality on systems beyond the vulnerable one.
- Integrity (other systems)
- NoneNo loss of integrity on systems beyond the vulnerable one.
- Availability (other systems)
- NoneNo loss of availability on systems beyond the vulnerable one.
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X. Scored by CNA (github.com).
Official description
Maravel, a PHP framework oriented towards dependency injection, prior to version 10.74.0 has a high-severity Token Replay Vulnerability arising from a structural lifecycle mismatch between stateless token validation engines and high-performance relational caching layers. Any application with low cache memory that causes premature eviction to free up memory and applications running macropay-solutions/maravel-framework that utilize tymon/jwt-auth for API token authentication and blacklist management or any other package that does the same may be affected. This architectural risk might also impact native Laravel applications utilizing cache tags under specific volatile or eviction-capped environments. tymon/jwt-auth automatically probes for cache tag support. If found, it forcefully wraps 14-day token blacklist entries (jti) inside a relational tymon.jwt tag. In environments where the O(1) Atomic Lazy Eviction model is active — either natively inside Maravel-Framework v20.x or manually backported into v10.x via the explicit DI container singletons provided in PR #104 (App\Cache\TaggedCache and App\Cache\TagSet) — a strict global tracking ceiling (Container::TAGGED_CACHE_TTL_CAP_SECONDS) of 7,200 seconds (2 hours) is enforced to secure the system against memory index bloat. This ceiling forcefully truncates the 14-day blacklist lifespan down to a maximum of 2 hours, after which individual tracking keys naturally expire and disappear from the active cache window. Furthermore, because the optimized engine implements a generational version matrix to achieve O(1) flush speeds, any programmatic or manual invocation of a tag flush or reset (e.g., Cache::tags([...])->flush()) instantly bumps the internal atomic master version pointer. This shifts the computed cryptographic composite hash (sha1($this->tags->getNamespace())) for all overlapping components, rendering the entire existing index immediately unreachable. Consequently, through either natural 2-hour expiration or an intervening tag flush execution (like the cache naturally cleaning old values to free up memory), the invalidation state records are entirely wiped out. Because the tokens' physical cryptographic signatures remain structurally valid for up to 14 days, stolen, hijacked, or legitimately logged-out tokens are instantly and silently resurrected across the entire API gateway, leaving the application critically vulnerable to widespread Token Replay Attacks. Because this issue is caused by an upstream architectural assumption within the tymon/jwt-auth package rather than a core defect inside the framework, there is no direct framework version upgrade that can safely bypass this lifecycle collision without breaking business cache recycling bounds. Maravel version 10.74.0 introduced a way to backport the new fixed tagged cache from 20.x into 10.x by resolving TagSet and TaggedCache from DI, which is how this latent architectural lifecycle vulnerability was discovered. Users must apply the decoupled configuration workaround outlined below. As a workaround, make sure that cache memory size does not generate early natural evictions from cache to free up space, deleting blacklisted jwt ids before they expire. Applications must decouple flat authentication vectors from the relational tagging subsystem. This forces token identifiers to write directly to the primary cache keyspace as flat, un-tagged key-value pairs where they securely retain their unclipped 14-day lifecycle.
Source: the CVE record as published by its numbering authority, via NVD and CVE.org.
The underlying weakness: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
A capture-replay flaw exists when the design of the product makes it possible for a malicious user to sniff network traffic and bypass authentication by replaying it to the server in question to the same effect as the original message (or with minor changes).
How developers prevent this class of flaw
- Utilize some sequence or time stamping functionality along with a checksum which takes this into account in order to ensure that messages can be parsed only once.
- Since any attacker who can listen to traffic can see sequence numbers, it is necessary to sign messages with some kind of cryptography to ensure that sequence numbers are not simply doctored along with content.
More Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerabilities (CWE-294)
Timeline
- CVE record published.
- CISA published its SSVC assessment (exploitation: none, automatable: yes, technical impact: partial).
- Record last changed materially (score, affected products, status or references).
References
Other references
Recent Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerabilities
- 7.4 High severity
- 7.4 High severity
- 7.4 High severity
- 7.4 High severity
- 7.4 High severity
- 9.8 Critical severity
Spotted an error? Tell us.