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CVE-2026-71884NVD status: Awaiting Analysis

BC-LTS-JAVA: Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption

Published Updated By the CyberSecBulletin desk

CVE-2026-71884 is a high-severity reusing a nonce, key pair in encryption vulnerability in BC-LTS-JAVA from Legion of the Bouncy Castle, with a CVSS 4.0 base score of 8.2 out of 10. It can be exploited remotely over the network by an unauthenticated attacker, without any action from a user. The record lists version 2.73.13 as the first without the flaw, so updating BC-LTS-JAVA to that release or later removes the exposure. There is no confirmed exploitation so far. EPSS estimates a 0.25% chance of exploitation within 30 days, which is low compared with other CVEs.

Next patch cycle

High severity with no evidence of exploitation so far.

What to do

  1. Update BC-LTS-JAVA to 2.73.13 or a later version.
  2. Until you can update, restrict network access to the affected service so it is not reachable from untrusted networks.

Affected products and versions

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed in
Legion of the Bouncy CastleBC-LTS-JAVA2.73.4 up to, but not including, 2.73.132.73.13

Version data comes from the organisation that assigned the CVE. Confirm against the vendor advisory before deciding you are unaffected.

How the severity score breaks down

Attack vector
NetworkCan be exploited remotely over a network, including the internet.
Attack complexity
LowNo special conditions are needed; the attack works reliably.
Attack requirements
PresentThe target must be in a specific state or configuration for the attack to work.
Privileges required
NoneNo account or login is needed.
User interaction
NoneNo action by a victim is required.
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
HighSerious loss of confidentiality on the vulnerable system.
Integrity (vulnerable system)
NoneNo loss of integrity on the vulnerable system.
Availability (vulnerable system)
NoneNo loss of availability on the vulnerable system.
Confidentiality (other systems)
NoneNo loss of confidentiality on systems beyond the vulnerable one.
Integrity (other systems)
NoneNo loss of integrity on systems beyond the vulnerable one.
Availability (other systems)
NoneNo loss of availability on systems beyond the vulnerable one.

Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber. Scored by CNA.

Official description

In Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, the native one-shot CTR packet cipher did not check that the requested input length fitted the counter space the IV left. In CTR mode the IV and the block counter share one 16-byte block, so an IV of 13 to 15 bytes leaves a counter of only 1 to 3 bytes, addressing 256, 65536 or 16777216 blocks respectively. Given a longer input the counter wrapped and the keystream repeated from the start of the same packet, and the call then returned the full input length as though every byte had been correctly transformed. Two segments of the message were therefore encrypted under the same keystream, so their plaintexts can be recovered from the ciphertext alone, without the key, while the caller saw neither an exception nor a short length to indicate it. The streaming implementation validates at init and again while processing, and the portable AESCTRPacketCipher rejects such a request with "Counter in CTR/SIC mode out of range.", but the native one-shot path has a single entry point and performed no counter-range validation there. It now preflights the IV-derived counter range and rejects an over-long request before any output is written, so the operation is failure-atomic and never reports success for bytes it did not correctly transform. A counter of four bytes or more cannot be exhausted by a Java int length and is unaffected, as is a full 16-byte IV, where the counter range is the caller's responsibility. Bouncy Castle for Java (bcprov) is not affected, as it ships no native implementations.

Source: the CVE record as published by its numbering authority, via NVD and CVE.org.

The underlying weakness: Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption

Nonces should be used for the present occasion and only once.

How developers prevent this class of flaw

  • Use techniques such as requiring incrementing, time based and/or challenge response to assure uniqueness of nonces.

More Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption vulnerabilities (CWE-323)

Timeline

  1. CVE record published.
  2. CISA published its SSVC assessment (exploitation: none, automatable: yes, technical impact: partial).
  3. Record last changed materially (score, affected products, status or references).

References

Other vulnerabilities in BC-LTS-JAVA

All BC-LTS-JAVA vulnerabilities

Recent Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption vulnerabilities

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