zephyr: Out-of-bounds Write
CVE-2026-90833 is a high-severity out-of-bounds write vulnerability in zephyr from Zephyr Project, with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.8 out of 10. It can be exploited with local access to the system by an attacker with a low-privileged account, without any action from a user. The record lists versions 4.3.2, 4.5.0 as the first without the flaw, so updating zephyr to one of those releases or later removes the exposure. There is no confirmed exploitation so far. EPSS estimates a 0.15% chance of exploitation within 30 days, which is low compared with other CVEs.
High severity with no evidence of exploitation so far.
What to do
- Update zephyr to 4.3.2 or 4.5.0, whichever matches your release line, or a later version.
- Read the advisory on github.com for workarounds and exact fixed builds.
Affected products and versions
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zephyr Project | zephyr | 2.2.0 up to, but not including, 4.3.2; 4.4.0 up to, but not including, 4.5.0 | 4.3.2, 4.5.0 |
Version data comes from the organisation that assigned the CVE. Confirm against the vendor advisory before deciding you are unaffected.
How the severity score breaks down
- Attack vector
- LocalThe attacker needs local access or must trick a user into running something.
- Attack complexity
- LowNo special conditions are needed; the attack works reliably.
- Privileges required
- LowA basic user account is enough.
- User interaction
- NoneNo action by a victim is required.
- Scope
- UnchangedImpact stays within the vulnerable component.
- Confidentiality
- HighAll data handled by the component can be read.
- Integrity
- HighData or code can be modified at will.
- Availability
- HighThe component can be taken down completely.
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Scored by CNA (zephyrproject.org).
Official description
The simulated EEPROM driver validated access ranges in eeprom_range_is_valid() (drivers/eeprom/eeprom_simulator.c) with a single test, (offset + len) <= config->size. Because offset is a signed off_t and len an unsigned size_t of the same rank, the addition is evaluated in unsigned arithmetic: a negative offset combined with a compensating len wraps the sum back into the accepted range. eeprom_sim_read() and eeprom_sim_write() then memcpy() through the EEPROM(addr) macro, which is plain pointer arithmetic on the driver's static mock_eeprom array, so the copy addresses memory located before that array. eeprom_read() and eeprom_write() are __syscall entry points, and their verification handlers in drivers/eeprom/eeprom_handlers.c check only the device object and the caller's own data buffer (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ/K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE) — the offset argument is passed to the driver unvalidated. With CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, a CONFIG_EEPROM_SIMULATOR device instance, and the device object granted to a user thread (the usage the in-tree tests/drivers/eeprom/api suite exercises from ZTEST_USER threads), an unprivileged thread could supply a negative offset and have the kernel perform the copy on its behalf. The result is an out-of-bounds read of kernel .bss returned into the caller's buffer and, via the write path, an out-of-bounds write of caller-supplied bytes over kernel memory preceding mock_eeprom. Both the start address and the length of the affected span are attacker-selected, so the primitive is sufficient to corrupt adjacent kernel state and escape the user-mode sandbox. Exposure is limited to builds that instantiate the simulated EEPROM (status = "okay" by default on qemu_x86 and native_sim, otherwise added by a devicetree overlay) together with userspace isolation. The fix rejects negative offsets and performs the remaining bound check without overflow.
Source: the CVE record as published by its numbering authority, via NVD and CVE.org.
The underlying weakness: Out-of-bounds Write
The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.
How developers prevent this class of flaw
- Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer. Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega, and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
- Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking. D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Timeline
- CVE record published.
- CISA published its SSVC assessment (exploitation: none, automatable: no, technical impact: total).
- Record last changed materially (score, affected products, status or references).
References
Patches and release notes
Other vulnerabilities in zephyr
- 7.8 High severity
- 9.1 Critical severity
- 8.3 High severity
- 7.5 High severity
- 7.8 High severity
- 7.5 High severity
Recent Out-of-bounds Write vulnerabilities
- 7.8 High severity
- 7.8 High severity
- 7.8 High severity
- 7.8 High severity
- 7.8 High severity
- 7.8 High severity
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