EVE OS vulnerabilities
8 known vulnerabilities in EVE OS from LF-Edge, Zededa. 8 are rated high or critical. Each entry lists the affected versions and the release that fixes it, where the vendor has published one.
Latest first
- 7.8 High severity
EVE OS: Use of Hard-coded Credentials
Due to the implementation of "deriveVaultKey", prior to version 7.10, the generated vault key would always have the last 16 bytes predetermined to be "arfoobarfoobarfo". This issue happens because "deriveVaultKey" calls "retrieveCloudKey" (which will always re
- 8.8 High severity
EVE OS: Insufficiently Protected Credentials
When sealing/unsealing the “vault” key, a list of PCRs is used, which defines which PCRs are used. In a previous project, CYMOTIVE found that the configuration is not protected by the secure boot, and in response Zededa implemented measurements on the config p
- 8.8 High severity
EVE OS: Insufficiently Protected Credentials
On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of “/config/GlobalConfig/global.json”. If the file exists, it overrides the existing configuration on the device on boot. This allows an attacker to change the system’s configuration, which
- 9.9 Critical severity
EVE OS: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
As noted in the “VTPM.md” file in the eve documentation, “VTPM is a server listening on port 8877 in EVE, exposing limited functionality of the TPM to the clients. VTPM allows clients to execute tpm2-tools binaries from a list of hardcoded options” The communi
- 8.8 High severity
EVE OS: Insufficiently Protected Credentials
On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of “/config/authorized_keys”. If the file is present, and contains a supported public key, the container will go on to open port 22 and enable sshd with the given keys as the authorized key
- 8.8 High severity
EVE OS: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
In EVE OS, the “measured boot” mechanism prevents a compromised device from accessing the encrypted data located in the vault. As per the “measured boot” design, the PCR values calculated at different stages of the boot process will change if any of their resp
- 8.8 High severity
EVE OS: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs The measured boot solution implemented in EVE OS leans on a PCR locking mechanism. Different parts of the system update different PCR values in the TPM, resulting in a unique value for each PCR entry. These PCRs are then used in
- 8.8 High severity
EVE OS: Insufficiently Protected Credentials
PCR14 is not in the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the “vault” key, but due to the change that was implemented in commit “7638364bc0acf8b5c481b5ce5fea11ad44ad7fd4”, fixing this issue alone would not solve the problem of the config partition not being measured c