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Use of Non-Canonical URL Paths for Authorization Decisions

CWE-647

The product defines policy namespaces and makes authorization decisions based on the assumption that a URL is canonical.

If an application defines policy namespaces and makes authorization decisions based on the URL, but it does not require or convert to a canonical URL before making the authorization decision, then it opens the application to attack. For example, if the application only wants to allow access to http://www.example.com/mypage, then the attacker might be able to bypass this restriction using equivalent URLs such as: http://WWW.EXAMPLE.COM/mypage http://www.example.com/%6Dypage (alternate encoding) http://192.168.1.1/mypage (IP address) http://www.example.com/mypage/ (trailing /) http://www.example.com:80/mypage

We track 6 vulnerabilities of this type. 100% are rated high or critical, and the average CVSS score is 8.5. 1 has been exploited in real attacks.

How this weakness is prevented

  • Architecture and Design: Make access control policy based on path information in canonical form, with all alternate encodings rejected (which can be accomplished by a default deny rule). Consider very restrictive regular expressions to validate that the path is in the expected form. Reject all alternate path encodings that are not in the expected canonical form.

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