CyberSecBulletin
CVE-2026-10658NVD status: Modified

zephyr: Out-of-bounds Write

Published Updated By the CyberSecBulletin desk

CVE-2026-10658 is a high-severity out-of-bounds write vulnerability in zephyr from Zephyr Project, with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.1 out of 10. It can be exploited from the same local network by an unauthenticated attacker, without any action from a user. The record lists version 4.6.0 as the first without the flaw, so updating zephyr to that release or later removes the exposure. There is no confirmed exploitation so far. EPSS estimates a 0.28% chance of exploitation within 30 days, which is low compared with other CVEs.

Next patch cycle

High severity with no evidence of exploitation so far.

What to do

  1. Update zephyr to 4.6.0 or a later version.
  2. Read the advisory on github.com for workarounds and exact fixed builds.

Affected products and versions

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed in
Zephyr Projectzephyr2.6.0 up to, but not including, 4.6.04.6.0

Version data comes from the organisation that assigned the CVE. Confirm against the vendor advisory before deciding you are unaffected.

How the severity score breaks down

Attack vector
AdjacentThe attacker must be on the same local network segment.
Attack complexity
LowNo special conditions are needed; the attack works reliably.
Privileges required
NoneNo account or login is needed.
User interaction
NoneNo action by a victim is required.
Scope
UnchangedImpact stays within the vulnerable component.
Confidentiality
LowSome restricted data can be read.
Integrity
NoneNothing can be modified.
Availability
HighThe component can be taken down completely.

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H. Scored by CNA (zephyrproject.org).

Official description

bt_iso_recv() in subsys/bluetooth/host/iso.c pulled the ISO SDU header (4 bytes) or, when the timestamp flag is set, the timestamped SDU header (8 bytes) from the inbound HCI ISO Data buffer via net_buf_pull_mem() without first checking buf->len. The upstream hci_iso() handler enforces buf->len == the controller-declared ISO Data_Load length, so a malicious or buggy controller / adjacent BLE peer on an established CIS/BIS can present a first-fragment (BT_ISO_START) or single (BT_ISO_SINGLE) PDU shorter than the SDU header. Because net_buf_simple_pull_mem only guards length with __ASSERT_NO_MSG (compiled out when CONFIG_ASSERT is disabled, the production default), the pull underflows buf->len (uint16_t, e.g. 0 - 8 = 0xFFF8) and advances buf->data past valid data: the subsequent reads of hdr->slen and hdr->sn are out-of-bounds reads of adjacent pool memory. For the multi-fragment (START) case the corrupted buffer is retained as iso->rx, and a following CONT/END fragment's net_buf_tailroom() guard underflows to a near-SIZE_MAX value, defeating the bounds check and causing net_buf_add_mem() to memcpy attacker-supplied fragment data far past the RX pool buffer (out-of-bounds write). The flaw affects ISO receive builds (CONFIG_BT_ISO_RX, selected by the default-off LE Audio options BT_ISO_PERIPHERAL/BT_ISO_CENTRAL/BT_ISO_SYNC_RECEIVER) and has existed since the ISO subsystem was introduced (v2.6.0) through v4.4.0. The fix adds explicit buf->len < sizeof(ts_hdr) and buf->len < sizeof(hdr) checks that drop the buffer before pulling.

Source: the CVE record as published by its numbering authority, via NVD and CVE.org.

The underlying weakness: Out-of-bounds Write

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

How developers prevent this class of flaw

  • Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer. Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega, and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
  • Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking. D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND discusses canary-based detection in detail.

More Out-of-bounds Write vulnerabilities (CWE-787)

Timeline

  1. CVE record published.
  2. CISA published its SSVC assessment (exploitation: none, automatable: no, technical impact: partial).
  3. Record last changed materially (score, affected products, status or references).

References

Other vulnerabilities in zephyr

All zephyr vulnerabilities

Recent Out-of-bounds Write vulnerabilities

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