CyberSecBulletin
CVE-2026-12522NVD status: Awaiting Analysis

zephyr: Out-of-bounds Write

Published Updated By the CyberSecBulletin desk

CVE-2026-12522 is a high-severity out-of-bounds write vulnerability in zephyr from Zephyr Project, with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 8.8 out of 10. It can be exploited from the same local network by an unauthenticated attacker, without any action from a user. The record lists versions 4.3.2, 4.4.2 as the first without the flaw, so updating zephyr to one of those releases or later removes the exposure. There is no confirmed exploitation so far. EPSS estimates a 0.34% chance of exploitation within 30 days, which is low compared with other CVEs.

Next patch cycle

High severity with no evidence of exploitation so far.

What to do

  1. Update zephyr to 4.3.2 or 4.4.2, whichever matches your release line, or a later version.
  2. Read the advisory on github.com for workarounds and exact fixed builds.

Affected products and versions

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed in
Zephyr Projectzephyr2.4.0 up to, but not including, 4.3.2; 4.4.0 up to, but not including, 4.4.24.3.2, 4.4.2

Version data comes from the organisation that assigned the CVE. Confirm against the vendor advisory before deciding you are unaffected.

How the severity score breaks down

Attack vector
AdjacentThe attacker must be on the same local network segment.
Attack complexity
LowNo special conditions are needed; the attack works reliably.
Privileges required
NoneNo account or login is needed.
User interaction
NoneNo action by a victim is required.
Scope
UnchangedImpact stays within the vulnerable component.
Confidentiality
HighAll data handled by the component can be read.
Integrity
HighData or code can be modified at will.
Availability
HighThe component can be taken down completely.

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Scored by CNA (zephyrproject.org).

Official description

The HL7800 cellular modem driver's +CGCONTRDP: response handler on_cmd_atcmdinfo_ipaddr() in drivers/modem/vendor_standalone/hl7800.c parses the PDP-context dynamic parameters (local address, subnet mask, gateway, and DNS servers) that the cellular network assigns to the device. The response is linearized into a 256-byte stack buffer, after which each address field length is computed from comma/. delimiter positions in the network-supplied data and used directly as the length argument to strncpy() into the fixed 64-byte stack buffer temp_addr_str (and the 16-byte iface_ctx.dns_v4_string). Because the field length is derived from attacker-controlled delimiter positions and was not bounded against the destination buffer, a single field can be far larger than 64 bytes. A malicious or impersonated cellular network (for example a rogue base station) can return a crafted +CGCONTRDP response with an overlong address field, causing strncpy() to write past temp_addr_str on the modem worker thread's stack, plus an out-of-bounds NUL write at temp_addr_str[addr_len]. No device-side privileges or user interaction are required: the device itself issues the AT+CGCONTRDP=1 query during normal network attach and parses whatever the network returns. The overflow corrupts adjacent stack memory in supervisor context, yielding at minimum a remotely triggerable crash and potentially control-flow hijacking on targets without stack protection. The fix bounds every field length against its destination buffer (temp_addr_str and dns_v4_string) before each copy, rejecting overlong fields.

Source: the CVE record as published by its numbering authority, via NVD and CVE.org.

The underlying weakness: Out-of-bounds Write

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

How developers prevent this class of flaw

  • Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer. Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega, and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
  • Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking. D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND discusses canary-based detection in detail.

More Out-of-bounds Write vulnerabilities (CWE-787)

Timeline

  1. CVE record published.
  2. CISA published its SSVC assessment (exploitation: none, automatable: no, technical impact: total).
  3. Record last changed materially (score, affected products, status or references).

References

Other vulnerabilities in zephyr

All zephyr vulnerabilities

Recent Out-of-bounds Write vulnerabilities

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