Net::SAML2: Improper Certificate Validation
CVE-2026-18089 is a high-severity improper certificate validation vulnerability in Net::SAML2 from Timlegge, with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.5 out of 10. It can be exploited remotely over the network by an unauthenticated attacker, without any action from a user. The record lists version 0.86 as the first without the flaw, so updating Net::SAML2 to that release or later removes the exposure. There is no confirmed exploitation so far. EPSS estimates a 0.23% chance of exploitation within 30 days, which is low compared with other CVEs.
High severity with no evidence of exploitation so far.
What to do
- Update Net::SAML2 to 0.86 or a later version.
- Update Net to 0.86 or a later version.
- Until you can update, restrict network access to the affected service so it is not reachable from untrusted networks.
Affected products and versions
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| TIMLEGGE | Net::SAML2 | before 0.86 | 0.86 |
| Timlegge | Net | before 0.86 | 0.86 |
Version data comes from the organisation that assigned the CVE. Confirm against the vendor advisory before deciding you are unaffected.
How the severity score breaks down
- Attack vector
- NetworkCan be exploited remotely over a network, including the internet.
- Attack complexity
- LowNo special conditions are needed; the attack works reliably.
- Privileges required
- NoneNo account or login is needed.
- User interaction
- NoneNo action by a victim is required.
- Scope
- UnchangedImpact stays within the vulnerable component.
- Confidentiality
- NoneNo data is disclosed.
- Integrity
- HighData or code can be modified at will.
- Availability
- NoneAvailability is not affected.
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N. Scored by CISA (ADP).
Official description
Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass by verifying responses against the response-embedded certificate in verify_xml when no trust anchor is configured. verify_xml in Net::SAML2::Role::VerifyXML runs "return if !$anchors && !$cacert;" as soon as the XML::Sig check succeeds, and that check uses the X.509 certificate taken from the response's own dsig:KeyInfo/dsig:X509Certificate element, so an unanchored response is checked only against the key it carries. Binding::POST declares cacert as an optional Maybe[Str] with no default, so a POST binding built without one takes that path, and _verify_encrypted_assertion returns early the same way with "return $xml unless $cacert;". Any caller that constructs Binding::POST or calls Assertion->new_from_xml without a cacert, cert_text, or anchors argument accepts a response signed by an attacker generated key whose self-signed certificate is embedded in that response, authenticating an arbitrary assertion.
Source: the CVE record as published by its numbering authority, via NVD and CVE.org.
The underlying weakness: Improper Certificate Validation
The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.
How developers prevent this class of flaw
- Certificates should be carefully managed and checked to assure that data are encrypted with the intended owner's public key.
- If certificate pinning is being used, ensure that all relevant properties of the certificate are fully validated before the certificate is pinned, including the hostname.
More Improper Certificate Validation vulnerabilities (CWE-295)
Timeline
- CVE record published.
- CISA published its SSVC assessment (exploitation: none, automatable: yes, technical impact: partial).
- Record last changed materially (score, affected products, status or references).
References
Patches and release notes
Other references
Other vulnerabilities in Net::SAML2
- 9.8 Critical severity
- 8.1 High severity
Recent Improper Certificate Validation vulnerabilities
- 7.4 High severity
- 7.3 High severity
- 9.1 Critical severity
- 9.1 Critical severity
- 9.8 Critical severity
- 8.2 High severity
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