Net::SAML2: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
CVE-2026-18108 is a critical-severity improper verification of cryptographic signature vulnerability in Net::SAML2 from Timlegge, with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.8 out of 10. It can be exploited remotely over the network by an unauthenticated attacker, without any action from a user. The record lists version 0.86 as the first without the flaw, so updating Net::SAML2 to that release or later removes the exposure. There is no confirmed exploitation so far. EPSS estimates a 0.31% chance of exploitation within 30 days, which is low compared with other CVEs.
Critical severity: a successful attack would have severe impact.
What to do
- Update Net::SAML2 to 0.86 or a later version.
- Update Net to 0.86 or a later version.
- Until you can update, restrict network access to the affected service so it is not reachable from untrusted networks.
Affected products and versions
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| TIMLEGGE | Net::SAML2 | before 0.86 | 0.86 |
| Timlegge | Net | before 0.86 | 0.86 |
Version data comes from the organisation that assigned the CVE. Confirm against the vendor advisory before deciding you are unaffected.
How the severity score breaks down
- Attack vector
- NetworkCan be exploited remotely over a network, including the internet.
- Attack complexity
- LowNo special conditions are needed; the attack works reliably.
- Privileges required
- NoneNo account or login is needed.
- User interaction
- NoneNo action by a victim is required.
- Scope
- UnchangedImpact stays within the vulnerable component.
- Confidentiality
- HighAll data handled by the component can be read.
- Integrity
- HighData or code can be modified at will.
- Availability
- HighThe component can be taken down completely.
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Scored by CISA (ADP).
Official description
Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication bypass because _verify_encrypted_assertion accepts an EncryptedAssertion whose decrypted content carries no signature. _verify_encrypted_assertion decrypts the EncryptedAssertion and returns it as verified when it carries no signature, via "return $xml unless $xpath->exists('dsig:Signature', $assert);". The signature check and the trust anchor check that follow run only when a signature is present, so a decrypted assertion with no dsig:Signature element reaches new_from_xml unverified and its NameID and attributes are read into the assertion object. An SP's encryption certificate is published in its SAML metadata so the IdP can encrypt to it, so any party can encrypt an unsigned assertion to that certificate, wrap it in a samlp:Response, and post it to the assertion consumer service. Any caller that configures a decryption key_file, and so accepts EncryptedAssertions, takes identity fields from an assertion that no trust anchor covers, and an unauthenticated party can authenticate as an arbitrary user. Callers with no key_file configured do not decrypt and are unaffected.
Source: the CVE record as published by its numbering authority, via NVD and CVE.org.
The underlying weakness: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.
More Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerabilities (CWE-347)
Timeline
- CVE record published.
- CISA published its SSVC assessment (exploitation: none, automatable: yes, technical impact: total).
- Record last changed materially (score, affected products, status or references).
References
Patches and release notes
Other references
Other vulnerabilities in Net::SAML2
- 8.1 High severity
- 7.5 High severity
Recent Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerabilities
- 9.2 Critical severity
- 7.5 High severity
- 9.1 Critical severity
- 7.5 High severity
- 7.5 High severity
- 7.5 High severity
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