zephyr: Use of Default Credentials
CVE-2026-19741 is a high-severity use of default credentials vulnerability in zephyr from Zephyr Project, with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.5 out of 10. It can be exploited from the same local network by an unauthenticated attacker, without any action from a user. The record lists versions 4.3.2, 4.5.0 as the first without the flaw, so updating zephyr to one of those releases or later removes the exposure. There is no confirmed exploitation so far. EPSS estimates a 0.26% chance of exploitation within 30 days, which is low compared with other CVEs.
High severity with no evidence of exploitation so far.
What to do
- Update zephyr to 4.3.2 or 4.5.0, whichever matches your release line, or a later version.
- Read the advisory on github.com for workarounds and exact fixed builds.
Affected products and versions
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zephyr Project | zephyr | 1.14.0 up to, but not including, 4.3.2; 4.4.0 up to, but not including, 4.5.0 | 4.3.2, 4.5.0 |
Version data comes from the organisation that assigned the CVE. Confirm against the vendor advisory before deciding you are unaffected.
How the severity score breaks down
- Attack vector
- AdjacentThe attacker must be on the same local network segment.
- Attack complexity
- HighSuccess depends on conditions outside the attacker's control.
- Privileges required
- NoneNo account or login is needed.
- User interaction
- NoneNo action by a victim is required.
- Scope
- UnchangedImpact stays within the vulnerable component.
- Confidentiality
- HighAll data handled by the component can be read.
- Integrity
- HighData or code can be modified at will.
- Availability
- HighThe component can be taken down completely.
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Scored by CNA (zephyrproject.org).
Official description
Zephyr's OpenThread integration defined CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD with default "J01NME" in modules/openthread/Kconfig.thread (previously subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig, then subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig.thread). J01NME is the example Joining Device Credential used throughout the public OpenThread and Thread commissioning documentation, including Zephyr's own samples/net/sockets/echo_client/README.rst, so it is not a secret. A firmware image built with CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART=y that never overrode the PSKd therefore shipped with a publicly known joining credential compiled in, with no build-time or run-time warning. The PSKd is the only value that authenticates Thread commissioning: joiner and commissioner run a DTLS-PSK handshake keyed on it, after which the commissioner supplies the full operational dataset. In ot_configure_instance() (modules/openthread/openthread.c), a device with no stored dataset calls otJoinerStart() with the configured PSKd, and ot_joiner_start_handler() calls otThreadSetEnabled() on success. An unauthenticated attacker within 802.15.4 radio range of an uncommissioned device (factory-fresh, after a factory reset, or after a settings erase) can run any stock Thread commissioner registered with J01NME, complete the handshake, and hand the device an attacker-controlled operational dataset. The device then joins and enables Thread on the attacker's mesh. The attacker becomes its router, seeing, dropping, injecting and spoofing all of the device's IPv6 traffic and impersonating the peers the application expects, while the device is cut off from the network it was meant to join and stays mis-provisioned until it is reset. Only application-layer security with independently provisioned credentials survives. Exposure is limited to builds that enable joiner autostart and leave the PSKd unset; the option is not enabled by default and no in-tree sample uses the vulnerable combination. The fix removes the default from CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD and adds a BUILD_ASSERT() in modules/openthread/openthread.c, active only under CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART, that fails the build unless a 6-to-32-character PSKd is configured. Products should provision a per-device PSKd from factory data and call otJoinerStart() from the application rather than relying on a credential compiled identically into every unit.
Source: the CVE record as published by its numbering authority, via NVD and CVE.org.
The underlying weakness: Use of Default Credentials
The product uses default credentials (such as passwords or cryptographic keys) for potentially critical functionality.
How developers prevent this class of flaw
- Prohibit use of default, hard-coded, or other values that do not vary for each installation of the product - especially for separate organizations.
- Force the administrator to change the credential upon installation.
- The product administrator could change the defaults upon installation or during operation.
Timeline
- CVE record published.
- CISA published its SSVC assessment (exploitation: none, automatable: no, technical impact: total).
- Record last changed materially (score, affected products, status or references).
References
Patches and release notes
Other vulnerabilities in zephyr
- 7.8 High severity
- 7.8 High severity
- 9.1 Critical severity
- 8.3 High severity
- 7.5 High severity
- 7.8 High severity
Recent Use of Default Credentials vulnerabilities
- 9.8 Critical severity
- 9.8 Critical severity
- 9.8 Critical severity
- 9.8 Critical severity
- 9.8 Critical severity
- 7.3 High severity
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