CyberSecBulletin

Dragonmonk111 vulnerabilities

We track 5 vulnerabilities in Dragonmonk111 products. 5 are rated high or critical, and none are known to be exploited. The most recent was published on May 12, 2026.

5vulnerabilities
1critical
4high
0exploited
8.7average CVSS score

Latest Dragonmonk111 vulnerabilities

  • 8.2 High severity

    junoclaw: Server-Side Request Forgery

    CVE-2026-43993Dragonmonk111

    JunoClaw is an agentic AI platform built on Juno Network. Prior to 0.x.y-security-1, the WAVS bridge's computeDataVerify called fetch() on agent-supplied URLs without validating scheme, port, or resolved IP, resulting in an SSRF vulnerability. This vulnerabili

  • 9.8 Critical severity

    junoclaw: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

    CVE-2026-43992Dragonmonk111

    JunoClaw is an agentic AI platform built on Juno Network. Prior to 0.x.y-security-1, every MCP write tool (send_tokens, execute_contract, instantiate_contract, upload_wasm, ibc_transfer, etc.) accepted 'mnemonic: string' as an explicit tool-call parameter. The

  • 8.4 High severity

    junoclaw: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command

    CVE-2026-43991Dragonmonk111

    JunoClaw is an agentic AI platform built on Juno Network. Prior to 0.x.y-security-1, substring-based blocklist in plugin-shell's command-safety check could be bypassed by adversarial argument constructions, allowing unauthorized command execution on the host w

  • 8.4 High severity

    junoclaw: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command

    CVE-2026-43990Dragonmonk111

    JunoClaw is an agentic AI platform built on Juno Network. Prior to 0.x.y-security-1, plugin-shell's run_command wrapped every agent-supplied command in 'sh -c' / 'cmd /C' and passed the full argument string to the shell's parser, allowing shell metacharacters

  • 8.5 High severity

    JunoClaw is an agentic AI platform built on Juno Network.

    CVE-2026-43989Dragonmonk111

    JunoClaw is an agentic AI platform built on Juno Network. Prior to 0.x.y-security-1, the upload_wasm MCP tool accepted a filesystem path from the agent and uploaded whatever bytes the path resolved to, with no validation of location, symlink target, file size,